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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is a consolidated appeal from two orders of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
In the first Order on appeal, the trial court sanctioned 
appellant' s failure to cooperate in discovery by striking its 
answer and entering its default. In the second Order, the trial 
court denied appellant's Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default 
judgment that had been entered as a result of the first Order. 
Appellant appealed the first Order to the Utah Supreme 
Court, then filed its motion under Rule 60(b) with the trial court. 
Upon denial of the Rule 60(b) motion, appellant once again appealed 
to the Utah Supreme Court. Upon pour-over to this court, the two 
appeals were consolidated. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-
3(2)(j), Rules 3(a), 4(a), and 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and the Utah Supreme Court7 s Orders dated February 20, 
1992 and April 3, 1992 pouring over the consolidated cases for 
disposition by the Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES QN APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing 
sanctions pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 37(b)(2)(C) against 
appellant for its failure to answer discovery requests that had 
been served almost six months previously? 
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2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing 
to set aside the default judgment that it had previously entered as 
a discovery sanction? 
The standard of review both issues is abuse of discre-
tion. Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Shettler. 768 P. 2d 950 (Utah App. 
1989). 
RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 31(h)(2): A complete copy of Utah 
R. Civ. P. Rule 37 is included in Appendix I hereto. In its relevant 
parts, Rule 37(b)(2) provides: 
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. 
If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit 
discovery, . . . the court may make such orders in regard to 
the failure as are just, and among others the following: 
* * * 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, 
staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismis-
sing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render-
ing a judgment by default against the disobedient party. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b): A complete copy of Utah 
R. Civ. P. Rule 60 is included in Appendix I hereto. In its relevant 
parts, Rule 60(b) provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect. . . . 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
1. Appellant, National Insurance Marketing Services, 
Inc., will hereafter be referred to as "NIMS". Appellee, GRO 
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Enterprises, Inc., will hereafter be referred to as "GRO Enterpris-
es". 
2. GRO Enterprises brought the complaint below to 
collect a debt on account. NIMS denied the obligation, asserting 
a credit for items purchased but allegedly returned to GRO 
Enterprises. 
3. On January 3, 1991, GRO Enterprises served NIMS with 
Interrogatories and a Request for Production of Documents. 
(R. 00012). 
4. When the discovery was not answered within the 30 
days provided by Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 33(a), GRO Enterprises's 
counsel sent a letter on February 14, 1991 to NIMS' s counsel, 
reminding him of the obligation to answer the outstanding discov-
ery. (R. 00015). 
5. In response to the February 14th letter, NIM' s 
counsel telephoned GRO Enterprises' s counsel and advised that the 
discovery answers would be filed within the week. (R. 00013). 
6. The discovery was not answered as promised. Two 
weeks later, on March 6, 1991, GRO Enterprises' s counsel again 
wrote to NIM' s counsel and asked that the discovery be answered. 
(R. 00016). 
7. On March 7th, GRO Enterprises' s counsel received a 
letter dated March 5 from NIM's counsel. (R. 00014 and 00017. ) The 
letter stated: 
Thank you for your courteous extensions of time 
granted to answer your discovery in the above-entitled 
matter. The first extension was granted because of my 
absence from the country. The second was granted because 
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Robert Weeks, president of National Insurance, was in 
Chile, South America. He will be returning on Friday, 
March 8, 1991, and we will promptly file our answers to 
your requested discovery. 
(R. 00017). 
8. No answers were filed. On April 3, 1991, more than 
three weeks after the March 7th letter, GRO Enterprises filed a 
Motion to Compel the answers to the discovery. (R. 00013-00020). 
9. NIMS did not respond to the Motion to Compel. On 
April 19, 1991, GRO Enterprises served a Request to Submit for 
Decision to NIMS. (R. 00022). The request was filed with the court 
on April 22nd. (R. 00021). 
10. On April 23rd, the court granted the Motion to 
Compel by minute entry, and mailed a copy to the parties' counsel 
on April 24th. (R. 00023). l The court entered its written Order 
granting the Motion to Compel on May 1st. (R. 00024-00025). 
11. NIMS's counsel then filed a withdrawal of counsel 
with the court. (R. 00028-00029). Although the withdrawal was 
dated April 22nd, neither the court nor GRO Enterprises received 
the document until May 1st, nine days after it had purportedly been 
mailed. (R. 00028 and 00035). 
1
 The original motion had been brought by GRO Enterprises as 
plaintiff, but the Request to Submit the Motion for Decision 
inadvertently requested the court to rule on "Defendant' s Motion to 
Compel". (R. 00021). Although the minute entry did grant the 
motion, it reflected the error in the submission request and 
ordered the wrong party, i.e., "plaintiff," to respond to the 
discovery. (R. 00023). At GRO Enterprises's request (R. 00026-
00027), the court corrected the error and entered its order 
compelling NIMS to answer the discovery (R. 00024-00025). 
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12. On the day the withdrawal of counsel was received, 
i. e. , May 1st, GRO Enterprises sent NIMS a Notice to Appear or 
Appoint New Counsel. (R. 00030-00031). 
13. Nine days later, on May 10th, GRO Enterprises' s 
counsel received a telephone call from an attorney who indicated 
that he was an attorney who would be representing NIMS in the 
lawsuit. In the course of that call, NIMS7 s successor counsel was 
advised of the court's May 1 order. (R. 00036). NIMS's successor 
counsel asked if the case could be settled by giving NIMS credit 
for certain items it claimed it had returned to GRO Enterprises. 
(R. 00082). GRO Enterprises' s counsel indicated she did not know 
about any such credits, but agreed to look into the matter. 
R. 00082). 
14. At his request, GRO Enterprises' counsel mailed 
NIMS' s successor counsel a copy of the Complaint, Answer and the 
outstanding discovery requests to which the court had compelled 
NIMS to respond. (R. 00036). 
15. Upon investigation of NIMS' s claim to a credit, GRO 
Enterprises's counsel discovered that NIMS, through its former 
counsel, had already previously insisted upon a credit for goods 
allegedly returned to GRO Enterprises. Before the lawsuit had 
even been filed, GRO Enterprises had already rejected the same 
settlement offer that was made in the May 10th telephone conversa-
tion. (R. 00044-00045). 
16. GRO Enterprises's counsel then wrote to NIMS' s 
counsel on June 3rd, informing him that the settlement offer had 
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already once been rejected. In the letter, GRO Enterprises gave 
NIMS the same 10 day period to answer the discovery as the court 
had previously ordered, and advised that GRO Enterprises would 
approach the court on June 14th for an order entering NIMS' s 
default if the discovery answers were not filed by then. 
(R. 00038). 
17. On June 14th, which was a Friday, NIMS7 s successor 
counsel called GRO Enterprises' s counsel' s office and left a 
message that he could not get the discovery answers filed that day, 
but would have them delivered on the following Monday, June 17th. 
(R. 00036). 
18. Although the affidavits below indicate that as of 
June 10th, NIMS' s successor counsel was having difficulty getting 
in touch with his client, the affidavits do not claim that this was 
ever communicated to GRO Enterprises' s counsel or to the court. 
Instead, NIMS' s counsel indicated that the discovery responses 
would be filed by June 17th. (R. 00040-00041, 00045, 00081-00083). 
19. No answers were filed or delivered on June 17th. 
(R. 00036), nor did NIMS' s counsel contact counsel for GRO Enter-
prises to advise that he was having difficulty getting in touch 
with NIMS. (R. 00045) 
20. On June 27th, when no discovery responses had been 
filed, GRO Enterprises filed a Motion for Entry of Default against 
NIMS. (R. 00033). 
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21. NIMS opposed the motion (R. 00040-42) and served 
answers to the Interrogatories on July 3rd. (R. 00043). No response 
was made to the Request for Production of Documents. 
22. The court granted the Motion for Entry of Default by 
minute entry on July 31, 1991 (R. 00049), and entered its order and 
default judgment against NIMS on August 14, 1991 (R. 00050-00051, 
00055-00056).2 
23. On September 16, 1991, NIMS appealed the court's 
August 14, 1991 order and judgment. (R. 00057-00058). 
24. On November 18, 1991, NIMS brought a motion pursuant 
to Rule 60(b)(1), Utah R. Civ. P. to set aside the default judgment 
(R. 00062-00063). NIMS argued that there was no willfulness in 
NIMS' s failure to answer the discovery, and that the court should 
not have imposed the discovery sanctions. (R. 00068-00072). NIMS 
also argued that in the interests of justice, the judgment should 
be set aside because GRO Enterprises had wrongfully refused NIMS1 s 
credit and it would be unfair to not allow NIMS to present its 
defenses. (R. 00072-00075). 
25. The court denied NIMS' s motion to set aside the 
default, and entered its order on January 23, 1992. (R. 00105). 
26. NIMS filed its notice of appeal of the January 23, 
1992 order on February 24, 1992. (R. 0015). 3 
2
 On March 16, 1992, the Order and Default Judgment were re-
entered as of August 22, 1991, nunc pro tunc, to cure a defect in 
service of the proposed forms of the orders. 
3
 February 22, 1992 was thirty days after the January 23 order 
was entered. However, February 22nd was a Saturday and the Notice 
of Appeal was filed on the following Monday. Utah R. App. P. Rule 22. 
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SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. The trial court properly imposed sanctions 
against NIMS for its failure to cooperate in discovery. A judgment 
by default is a sanction available to a trial court upon a party' s 
failure to fulfill its discovery obligations. In the case below, 
NIMS received during the course of the litigation, not one, but 
four extensions of time within which to answer outstanding 
discovery. NIMS made continual unfulfilled promises that it would 
answer the discovery promptly, delaying the litigation for months. 
NIMS never advised GRO Enterprises or the court that it was having 
any difficulty answering the discovery until after GRO Enterprises 
had moved the court for entry of judgment. Based upon NIMS' s 
conduct, the trial court acted well within its discretion by 
sanctioning NIMS' s conduct with entry of default judgment. 
POINT II. NIMS's "Rule 60(b)" motion was in 
substance a motion to reconsider. The "excusable neglect" upon 
which NIMS1 s motion was predicated was not neglect in responding to 
the Motion to Enter Default, but alleged neglect in failing to 
answer discovery. In entering default judgment, the court had 
already ruled on that allegation of neglect. NIMS's "Rule 60(b)" 
motion was merely an effort to have the court reconsider its 
previous ruling. Such a motion is abortive under the rules and was 
properly denied. 
POINT III. NIMS did not show sufficient grounds under 
Rule 60(b) to justify setting aside the default judgment. NIMS 
argues that the "interests of justice" mandate setting aside the 
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claims a credit. Therefore, NIMS argues. r: u.,. be allowed to 
prese^4- -•- defenses NIMF' r re! i nr^^ • " misplaced, 
i .. . - „ . : - . . . . . 'i I II I In) 
motic here was . "excusable neglect" sufficient to support a 
Rule 80(b) moti on
 r given NIMS's conduct, and the trial court acted 
within i u —iscretion in denying the motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POT NT I , 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY IMPOSED SANCTIONS 
AGAINST NIMS FOR ITS FAILURE 
TO COOPERATE IN DISCOVERY. 
I 3 
the options avdiiab.- ^ JOUII . ^ - ,» in . iLigant 
violates . __;., rt -. and refuser • . ope -ate in discovery. 
•j .ie geneiu.. 
case who refuses to respond to an order compe j 
discovery is subject to sanctions pursuant I 
R. Civ- P. 37(b)(2))C). The sanctions ar i 
to deter misconduct in connection with 
and require a showing of "willfulness i ;..i.'cr., 
or fault" on the part of the ~- ' * y. 
The choice of an appropriate d is 
primarily the responsibility of tne tna. ]uage and 
will not be reversed absent an ahu~r -*" -c-e-*--— 
(citations omitted). 
First Federal Sa v inas & Loan Ass oc. v . S chamanek. 7 
(Utah 1984). In explaining the trial court's latitude with respect 
to Rule 3 7 (] : ) the U tali Court of Appeals A n Schoney v. Memorial 
Estates, 1 90 P 2d 58 4 (U t ;,« ill App 1 990 ) stated: 
Management of the actions pending before it is 
uniquely the business of the trial court and while 
an appellate court may, of course, intervene if 
discretion is abused, we accord trial courts consi-
derable latitude in this regard and considerable 
deference to their determinations concerning dis-
covery. 
Id. at 585. 
Among the possible sanctions available to the trial court 
upon a party' s failure to fulfill its discovery obligations is the 
rendering of a judgment by default against the disobedient party. 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C). Thus a trial court's decision to enter a 
default judgment as a sanction against an uncooperative defendant 
is subject to review only for abuse of discretion. 
A review of the record in the instant case reveals NIMS 
as an elusive and uncooperative defendant: 
1. Purina the course of the litigation, NIMS received 
not one, but four extensions of time within which to answer the 
discovery. At first, NIMS failed to respond to the discovery by 
its due date on February 6, 1991. GRO Enterprises wrote to NIMS' s 
counsel and asked that a response be filed. NIMS advised that it 
needed an extra week, which extension GRO Enterprises granted. On 
March 6th, GRO Enterprises once again requested NIMS to answer the 
discovery. NIMS thanked GRO Enterprises for the two extensions, 
and promised that the answers would be filed promptly. GRO 
Enterprises waited another three weeks before it finally filed its 
Motion to Compel on April 3, 1992. The time for filing a response 
to the Motion to Compel expired on April 16. NIMS made no response 
to the motion, so GRO Enterprises submitted it to the court for 
decision. The court ordered NIMS to answer, and gave it until May 
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11th to respo ^ +-he appearance of NTMS's new counsel ^ D 0 
Enterprises gave NIMS another extension - .*i.- I4t. ^n at 
t " ' i ir in i i i; > 11 i in in in I in II ' r 
i t^v, . :^ zn<~ u ^ ^ - ^ -w^ s a n c t i o n s . NIMS had airrh ..<.: wyp^j-cunity t o ; * *3 
a r e s p o n s e , from F e b r u a r y 6, 1 993 when t h e answers were f i r s t <i»e 
v i i i l in II i i 1 ii mi in / 1 Hi i i i terpj ::i s e s f:l xic : 
e n t r y of d e l au I.I 
2. NIMS delayed GRO Enterprises for months with 
con t1nua 1 promises v...^  >. J. *, v«uuJ.u ,'uubwt;i u11^ i,jLbuuvt!i u±.o111JJL,-L % i 
February, NIMS's counsel promised the ovej iue discovery answers 
within the ndica^ed v-•:-• H ^ "H^ or* - *-- * • .« >- - =>»•><=[ 
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promised a prompt response to the unanswered discovery, • excuse 
T\ :drawal of NIMS' s counsel a t: tin is time is a red 
herring that has no bearing on NIMS' s responsibility to cooperate 
in the discovery process or on the court' s subsequent sanction of 
NIMS1' s conduct. Notably, entry of the 1 1. =1,5 1 order is not on 
appeal. The Motion to Compel was granted on May 1st because 1) the 
trial judge had obviously not yet seen or apparently even received 
the withdrawal, 2) good cause appeared for granting the motion 
based on NIMS' s failure to meet two extension deadlines, and 3) no 
opposition had been filed by the April 16th deadline for any such 
opposition. The purported April 22d withdrawal, filed with the 
court on May 1st, came after expiration of the deadline for 
opposition to the Motion to Compel and after GRO Enterprises liad 
served its Request to Submit the Motion for Decision. 
Furthermore, the entry of the Order on May 1st did not preju-
dice NIMS in any way. NIMS had shirked its discovery responsibili-
ties before the court ever entered the May 1st order. After the 
order was entered, and knowing that it had not met previous dead-
lines, NIMS further delayed by proffering an already rejected 
settlement through counsel who were unaware of previous negotia-
tions. NIMS' s principal, well aware that the settlement had 
already been rejected, then left the country without making 
adequate arrangements for the discovery to be answered. After its 
May 1st Order, the court gave NIMS 10 days to answer the discovery. 
NIMS obtained new counsel on May 10th, and the Motion for Entry of 
Default was not filed until weeks later, on June 27th. 
:II i 
then was that NIMS' s principal officer had been out of the country 
and could not assist in preparation of the answers. The answers 
were promised to be filed promptly. Then after the Motion to 
Compel had been granted and after NIMS obtained new counsel, NIMS 
once again promised answers; this time they would be delivered on 
June 17th. Despite all NIMS' s promises, no answers at all were 
filed until after GRO Enterprises filed its Motion for Entry of 
Default. And even then, NIMS did not file a response to the 
Request for Production of Documents. NIMS' s continued course of 
conduct in promising responses to the discovery delayed the case 
for months. 
3. NIMS did not advise GRO Enterprises or the court 
that it was having difficulty meeting the final June 14th exten-
sion, until after GRO Enterprises had moved the court for entry of 
default. NIMS' s counsel' s affidavits claim that as of June 10th, 
NIMS' s principal officer was out of the country and unable to 
assist him in answering the discovery requests. GRO Enterprises 
was not advised of that fact, but instead, on June 14th was told 
the answers would be filed on June 17th. GRO Enterprises did not 
file its Motion for Entry of Default until ten days after that, on 
June 27th. Yet even with that one final extension of time, and 
despite GRO Enterprises' s forewarning that it would ask the court 
for entry of default, NIMS made no further effort to communicate 
with GRO Enterprises, and made no motion to the court for an 
extension of time. The alleged difficulty in obtaining discovery 
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responses was not ra Ised until after the MJ :> tion, to Enter Default 
had been filed. 
A revi ew of the record shows tha I: the c :: >u 3 :  t had amp] e 
grounds to ..-wbelie v e NIMS' u claim thai I ts fai lure to cooperate 
was withoir ult. The trial court acted, we3 1 within its discre-
1 11«i""I ,i i i ' I i ' l i t f i ' i I I | i I !': rl|l I: iiu I I , 
POINT i i . 
NIMS' t . . .LE 60 (B)" WUT10N WAS SIMPLY 
A MOTION TO RECONSIDER, 
~" I S ABORTIVE UNDER THE RULES 
AND PROPERLY DENIED. 
NI ) 
s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l a m e n t - n a t a ad be*-n e n t e r e d >.** : 
The m o t i o n - - r » a : 1 nn ^ f f ^ r f - ^ r*~,^ r> - H P • .--, =,i <~*^*ir ^AA^r 
i 
In ; . . p p c : * *>r : t^ w l e h'*'U Nl F^ S d i d tot o f f m y 
e v i d e n c e i n ^ ^ r a i * ^ ^ -*.of- ->,•, ^ * ^ , .^ i . ~ ^ ~ o r d : i r g LU \JRO 
I _ _ ^ n o t h a \ 3 , ;:^ o p p o r t u -
n i t y '-" •- a d d r e s s t h e n o t a MI Nor d : i NIMS ew 
ev ide^f" - " i v n d l n b l e a t o r j j e f . " ; 
c i -i-^r.e uUiC*, . n s u p p o r t " ^* ... .. 
NIMS f i l e d a n a d d i t i o n a l a f f i d a v i t r e i t e r a t i n g t h e r e a s o n s or •. N! MS 
d i d n o t r e s p o n d t o tin e d i s c o v e r y - • »-*- —- - -+.!.-.—•*.-• . . .•
 : 
t h • p r c j - : : Jl : , " ! : ' " ^IP n o u . , -~~^ ., *
 w« 1 
sanctioning NIMS for ts failure to J es: .: . :>* :i^covery. In 
other worJ- M""" . - .1 . 
discovery. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a "motion to 
reconsider" does not exist, and is, in fact, abortive under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah State Employees Credit Union 
v. Riding. 24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P. 2d 1 (1970). In articulating the 
reasoning behind that position, the Utah Supreme Court, in Peay v. 
Peay, 607 P. 2d 841, 843 (Utah 1980), stated: 
"[I]f the party ruled against were per-
mitted to go beyond the rules, make the motion 
for reconsideration, and persuade the judge to 
reverse himself, the question arises, why 
should not the other party who is now ruled 
against be permitted to make a motion for re-
re-consideration, asking the court to again 
reverse himself? 
* * * 
" . . . in order to avoid such a state of 
indecision for both the judge and the parties, 
practical expediency demands that there be 
some finality to the actions of the court; and 
he should not be in the position of having the 
further duty of acting as a court of review 
upon his own ruling. " 
Peav v. Peay, 607 P. 2d, 843, quoting Drurv v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 
74, 415 P. 2d 662 (1966). 
At the time NIMS7 s Rule 60(b) motion was brought, NIMS had 
already appealed the discovery sanctions. The docketing statement 
set forth the issue on appeal as: 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion 
bv sanctioning the failure to respond to 
discovery with a default judgment entered in 
the principal sum of $12,559. 70 (giving no 
allowance for the $11,050.00 credit claimed) 
on the basis of an Order entered when defen-
dant was unrepresented by counsel, where after 
the appearance of new counsel and the break-
down of settlement negotiations, appropriate 
response was made to the discovery within a 
14 
mon espite the defendant's principal offers 
of ig in CVii i^9 remphasis added] 
NIMS ix-, *. .Niocict; ,i Appeal precisely because it did rrt 
agree with the trial \ urf : determination ' r- " h*: sanctions were 
c ' • ) 
raoiiun wab preuicatea was I^J, negiee; ; .-.:-puiiuinu L;> uie riotxon 
to Enter Defau ] t , hi it a] leged neglect r fai - ^ •»-<-> a n s w e r 
C . I II ] 5 ()(] ] C 
the original Motion to Enter Default, and i* was properly denied. 
POINT III. 
NIMS DID NOT SHOW SUFFICIENT GROUNDS UNDER 
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NIMS' reliance on Rule 60(b) is misplaced. NIMS has known 
from the commencement of the lawsuit that it claimed defenses to 
the lawsuit. It was presumably the subject of the accord and 
satisfaction defense presented in defendant' s Answer to the 
Complaint. But NIMS7 s argument about the offset goes, not to an 
allegation of injustice, but to the merits of the case, which 
cannot even be considered on a Rule 60(b) motion. Lars en v. 
Collina, 684 P. 2d 52 (Utah 1984). If all defendants were to be 
allowed relief from default because they suffered hardship of being 
unable to present their defenses, no default judgment would ever 
stand. 
Even if the excuses NIMS offered for failing to answer the 
discovery were the proper basis for a Rule 60(b) motion, NIMS still 
did not show sufficient grounds to justify setting aside the 
default judgment. For more than three months prior to NIMs' new 
counsel' s entry of appearance, NIMS failed to answer the discovery. 
Absolutely no excuse has been offered for that lengthy delay. 
After NIMs' new counsel entered an appearance, still no effort was 
made to apprise Gro Enterprises or the court of any difficulties 
NIMS was having in answering the discovery. Indeed, as of June 27, 
1991, and after three extensions and a court Order requiring the 
defendant to answer, NIMS had still not filed answers, and had 
given no indication to Gro Enterprises that it had undertaken any 
efforts at all to answer the discovery. While NIMS' s successor 
counsel may not have been at fault in failing to respond to the 
outstanding discovery, NIMS itself had failed for months to 
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judgment. NIMS failed to show that the default judgment was 
entered as a result of excusable neglect. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
In controlling and managing its own calendar, the trial court 
is given broad discretion to sanction a litigant7 s failure to 
cooperate in discovery. In the case below, the trial court7 s 
discretion was properly exercised, both in first sanctioning NIMS7 s 
conduct with entry of a default and them refusing to reconsider its 
decision. The Default Judgment and the Order denying NIMS7 s motion 
to set aside the Default Judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this (I day of June, 1992, 
Leslie Van Frank 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that^rtrue and correct jz&pr' 
of the foregoing was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the f 1*^ day 
of June, 1992, to the following: 
Lynn P. Heward 
Delwin T. Pond 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
923 East 5350 South, #E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 
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APPENDIX I 
Rule 33 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Utah 341,150 P. 935 (1915); State v. De Pretto, 
48 Utah 249, 155 P. 336 (1916). 
—Unavailability of witness. 
By applying the Utah Rules of Evidence to 
the issue of unavailability of a witness and 
thereby denying admission of a deposition, the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion. State 
ex rel. State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 
742 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
—Use by either party. 
Either party could introduce all or any com-
petent and relevant parts of deposition which 
were not fragmentary or misleading; opposing 
party could put in evidence any other relevant 
part. Where one party offered part and oppos-
ing party offered other parts which merely 
modified or explained that offered by first 
party, what was offered by both parties made 
deponent witness of first party; but if parts of-
fered by opposing party in no particular modi-
fied or explained what was offered by first 
party, as to parts offered by each, deponent was 
witness for each. Brooks v. Scoville, 81 Utah 
163, 17 P.2d 218 (1932). 
Publication. 
Subdivision (d) now makes "publication" of a 
deposition unnecessary. Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions 
and Discovery § 193 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 26A CJ.S. Depositions §§ 19, 56, 
88 et seq., 96, 100, 105. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility in evidence of depo-
sition as against one not a party at time of its 
taking, 4 A.L.R.3d 1075. 
Party's right to use, as evidence in civil trial, 
his own testimony given upon interrogatories 
or depositions taken by opponent, 13 A.L.R.3d 
1312. 
Libel and slander: application of privilege at-
tending statements made in course of judicial 
proceedings to pretrial deposition and discov-
ery procedures, 23 A.L.R.3d 1172. 
Physician-patient privilege, pretrial testi-
mony or disclosure on discovery by party to 
personal injury action as to nature of injuries 
or treatment as waiver of, 25 A.L.R.3d 1401. 
Privilege, assertion of, in pretrial discovery 
proceedings as precluding waiver of privilege 
at trial, 36 A.L.R.3d 1367. 
Key Numbers. — Depositions «» 53, 86 et 
seq., 88, 104, 107, 111. 
Rule 33. Interrogatories to parties, 
(a) Availability; procedures for use. Any party may serve upon any 
other party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if 
the party served is a public or private corporation, a partnership, an associa-
tion, or a governmental agency, by any officer or agent, who shall furnish 
such information as is available to the party. Interrogatories may, without 
leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action 
and upon any other party with or after service of the summons and complaint 
upon that party. 
Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in writing under 
oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the reasons for objection shall be 
stated in lieu of an answer. The answers are to be signed by the person 
making them, and the objections signed by the attorney making them. The 
party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of 
the answers and objections, if any, within 30 days after the service of the 
interrogatories, except that a defendant may serve answers or objections 
within 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon that defen-
dant. The court may allow a shorter or longer time. The party submitting the 
interrogatories may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with respect to any 
objection to or other failure to answer an interrogatory. 
(b) Scope; use at trial. Interrogatories may relate to any matters which 
can be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and the answers may be used to the 
extent permitted by the Rules of Evidence. 
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An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely 
because an answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that 
relates to fact or the application of law to fact, but the court may order that 
such an interrogatory need not be answered until after designated discovery 
has been completed or until a pretrial conference or other later time. 
(c) Option to produce business records. Where the answer to an inter-
rogatory may be derived or ascertained from the business records of the party 
upon whom the interrogatory has been served or from an examination, audit, 
or inspection of such business records, including a compilation, abstract, or 
summary thereof and the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is 
substantially the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party 
served, it is a sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify the records 
from which the answer may be derived or ascertained and to afford to the 
party serving the interrogatory reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or 
inspect such records and to make copies, compilations, abstracts, or summa-
ries. A specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the interrogating 
party to locate and to identify, as readily as can the party served, the records 
from which the answer may be ascertained. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
to Rule 33, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules 401 to 411, U.R.E. 
Business entries and the like, admissibility 
of, Rule 803(6), U.R.E. 
ANALYSIS 
Privilege against self-incrimination. 
Use at trial. 




Privilege against self-incrimination. 
Privilege against self-incrimination may be 
asserted in civil discovery proceedings, includ-
ing interrogatories; however, to sustain an as-
sertion of the privilege, a party must show that 
the responses sought to be compelled might be 
incriminating. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984). 
Use at trial. 
—Admissions against interest. 
Where answers to interrogatories are to be 
used to establish a fact, they can only be used 
Computation of time, Rule 6(a). 
Discovery procedures, Rule 4-502, Rules of 
Judicial Administration. 
Pretrial procedure; formulating issues, Rule 
16. 
as admissions against the party making them; 
thus, they are objectionable when offered by 
the party making them because they are self-
serving and not subject to cross-examination. 
Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Cent., Inc., 25 Utah 
2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970). 
—Impeachment. 
Unsigned interrogatories. 
Interrogatories signed by general manager 
on behalf of corporate defendant could be used 
to impeach the only witness who testified on 
behalf of defendant even though the witness 
did not sign the interrogatories. Kusy v. K-
Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232 
(Utah 1984). 
Cited in State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Petty, 
17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914 (1966); W.W. & 
W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park W. Village, Inc., 
568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977); Erickson v. Wasatch 
Manor, 802 P.2d 1323 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Key Numbers. — New Trial *=» 13 et seq., 
110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders* During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move foiLa 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to to set aside judgment, §§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24, 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 78-6-14; Appx. D, Code of Judicial Administra-
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion tion. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Correction after appeal. 
«A , .* . , „,, —Bate of judgment. 
Any other reason justifying relief.
 Void judgment. 
—Default judgment. —Estate record. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. —Inherent power of courts. 
—Incompetent counsel. —Intent of court and parties. 
—Lack of due process. —Judicial error distinguished. 
—Merits of case. —Order prepared by counsel. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. —Predating of new trial motion. 
—Real party in interest. Court's discretion. 
Appeals. Default judgment. 
Clerical mistakes. Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Computation of damages. —Admissions. 
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